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Abstract: This article explores the way in which Russian and Chinese governments have rearticulated 
global trends towards active citizenship and participatory governance, and integrated them into pre-
existing illiberal political traditions. The concept of ‘participatory authoritarianism’ is proposed in order 
to capture the resulting practices of local governance that, on the one hand enable citizens to engage 
directly with local officials in the policy process, but limit, direct and control civic participation on the 
other. The article explores the emergence of discourses of active citizenship at the national level and 
the accompanying legislative development of government-organised participatory mechanisms, 
demonstrating how the twin logics of openness and control, pluralism and monism, are built into their 
rationale and implementation. It argues that as state bureaucracies have integrated into international 
financial markets, so new participatory mechanisms have become more important for local governance 
as government agencies have lost the monopoly of information for effective policy-making. Practices 
of participatory authoritarianism enable governments to implement public sector reform while directing 
increased civic agency into non-threatening channels. 
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This article explores the way in which internationally promoted norms of good governance, 
which involve expanding citizen participation in local policy processes, are put into practice 
by local governments in two non-democratic states: Russia and China. It identifies a set of 
practices, enacted by local officials through multiplying government-sanctioned participatory 
mechanisms at municipal, district and street levels, that, on the one hand, enable citizens to 
engage directly with local officials in policy processes, but limit and undermine civic 
participation on the other. I term this set of practices ‘participatory authoritarianism’. While 
my empirical focus considers the emergence of discourses of active citizenship and the 
legislative development of new government-organised participatory mechanisms in post-
Soviet Russia and post-reform China, I hope to make two broader contributions to the study of 
authoritarian governance. First, I bring two hitherto discrete bodies of literature into 
conversation with one another, namely those on local governance by Russia specialists and 
those by China specialists, trace common trends in citizen participation and thereby draw out 
conclusions that apply in both cases. Second, I show how globally promoted, ostensibly 
democratic discourses and practices, such as participatory governance, are employed in order 
to maintain domestic non-democratic rule.1  
 
While both pre-reform China and Soviet-era Russia operated elaborate procedures for 
garnering citizens’ views on local policy issues, the adoption of market-oriented reforms in 
both states has facilitated the proliferation of new types of local government-approved 
participatory mechanisms that envisage a more active and autonomous role for citizens in local 
 
1  In the context of local governance, I refer to democratic practices as those that promote pluralism and 
authoritarian practices as those that stifle it, or promote monism. However, although participation suggests a 
growing plurality of voices in governance, my research shows that participatory practices are not always 




governance.2 However, this engagement occurs in an environment where more independent 
channels of participation are curtailed and regime-level democratisation is absent. In Russia, 
the space for electoral participation has narrowed following Putin’s return to the presidency in 
2012, and scholars increasingly classify the regime as ‘authoritarian’, rather than ‘hybrid’.3 In 
China, while national elections have never occurred, analysts note increasingly repressive 
domestic governance under Xi Jinping. 4  In what follows, I consider how these two non-
democratic states recontextualise global trends towards greater participatory governance, 
arguing that the combination of a lack of independent feedback channels with a fragmenting 
and privatising state sector and increasingly educated, politically aware, middle-class 
citizenries means that non-democratic states must develop innovations that address the 
resultant knowledge gap in policy-making processes while managing and directing heightened 
civic energy. 
 
The  literature on nominally democratic institutions in non-democratic settings can be broadly 
divided into two camps: one that suggests such institutions have negligible democratising 
effects on the overall character of authoritarian regimes5 and one that suggests that their impact 
 
2 Catherine Owen and Eleanor Bindman, ‘Civic Participation in a Hybrid Regime: Limited Pluralism in Policy-
Making and Delivery in Contemporary Russia’, Government and Opposition 54:1 (2019), pp. 98-120; Jane 
Duckett and Hua Wang, ‘Extending Political Participation in China: New Opportunities for Citizens in the Policy 
Process, Journal of Asian Public Policy 6:3 (2013), pp. 263-276; Oscar Almén, ‘Participatory Innovations Under 
Authoritarianism: Accountability and Responsiveness in Hangzhou’s Social Assessment of Government 
Performance’, Journal of Contemporary China 27: 110 (2018), pp. 165-179. 
3 Vladimir Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes (Pittsburgh, MA: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 2015); Graeme Gill, Building an Authoritarian Polity: Russia in Post-Soviet Times 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
4 George Yin, ‘Domestic repression and international aggression? Why Xi is uninterested in diversionary 
conflict’, Brookings Institute, 22 January 2019. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/domestic-
repression-and-international-aggression-why-xi-is-uninterested-in-diversionary-conflict/.  
5 Stanislav Markus, ‘Capitalists of All Russia, Unite! Business Mobilization under Debilitated Dirigisme’, Polity 
39:3 (2007), pp. 277–304; Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Prezworski, ‘Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of 
Autocrats’, Comparative Political Studies 40:11 (2007), pp. 1279-1301; Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for 




requires us to reclassify regimes as ‘hybrid’.6 However, the bulk of both strands focus on 
national-level institutions and processes – parliaments, legislatures and elections. Research on 
participatory institutions at the local level less explicitly engage with questions of regime type, 
but their conclusions tend to confirm the first view: local participatory mechanisms contribute 
to national regime stability by enabling governments to access citizens’ views on local issues, 
vital for effective policy-making (and hence for minimising discontent),7  and channelling 
growing middle-class political consciousness into approved, non-threatening fora, reducing the 
risk of unmanageable civic activism.8 They also enable governments to demonstrate adherence 
to globally promoted trends of civic engagement and good governance, challenging accusations 
of authoritarian rule from both domestic and international critics. Thus, the existence of 
participatory mechanisms should not be taken as prima facie evidence that an authoritarian 
regime is shifting towards hybridity or democracy and explains why non-democratic leaders 
are keen to promote local civic participation. While the research presented below supports these 
conclusions, the present article is less concerned with exploring the effects of local institutions 
on national regime type, and more with tracing the ways in which non-democratic leaders 
promote and manage the new forms of active citizenship produced through state transformation. 
Below, I seek to demonstrate the shift in relationship between government and citizen in 
 
6 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold 
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Matthijs Bogaards, ‘How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? 
Defective Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism’, Democratization 16:2 (2009), pp. 399-423; Henry Halee, 
‘Hybrid Regimes’ in The Dynamics of Democratization: Dictatorship, Development, and Diffusion, edited by 
Nathan J. Brown, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), pp. 23-45; Leah Gilbert and 
Payam Mohseni, ‘Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes’, Studies in 
Comparative International Development 46:3 (2011), pp. 270–297. Andreas Schedler (2013) The Politics of 
Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 78-
82. 
7 Martin Dimitrov, ‘What the Party Wanted to Know: Citizen Complaints as a “Barometer of Public Opinion” in 
Communist Bulgaria’, East European Politics and Societies 28 (2014), pp. 271-295; Laura Luehrmann, ‘Facing 
Citizen Complaints in China, 1951—1996’, Asian Survey 43:5 (2003), pp. 845-866; Rory Truex, Making 
Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016). 
8 Mary Gallagher, ‘“Reform and Openness”: Why China's Economic Reforms Have Delayed Democracy’, 
World Politics 54:2 (2002), p. 372; Catherine Owen, ‘“Consentful contention” in a Corporate State: Human 








Scholars of China have long noted local participatory developments within broader 
authoritarian conditions, and have produced numerous useful conceptualisations. 9  These 
include ‘populist authoritarianism’, which captures the combination of high support for the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with high levels of political protest 10 ; ‘authoritarian 
deliberation’, which conceptualises the proliferation of consultative mechanisms in China’s 
non-democratic polity11; ‘consultative authoritarianism’, which explores China’s increasingly 
active yet controlled civil society groups12; and ‘authoritarian responsiveness’, which considers 
whether state officials implement societal demands.13 Why has there been a dearth of attempts 
to conceptualise this development in the case of Russia? Many scholars of Russian politics 
appeared blinkered by the legacy of the transition paradigm, which assumed that countries 
emerging from the USSR were set upon an inevitable trajectory of democratisation.14 Hence, 
studies tended to focus on whether the institutions of liberal democracy such as civil society 
are shifting towards consolidation or co-optation,15  which, while certainly worthy of scholarly 
 
9 The first major study was Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing (Cambridge, MA. Harvard University 
Press, 1997). 
10 Wenfang Tang, Populist Authoritarianism: Chinese Political Culture and Regime Sustainability (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2016). For more on protest as a feedback mechanism see Peter Lorentzen, 
‘Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime’, Quarterly Journal of Political 
Science 8 (2013), pp. 127-158; Chen Xi, Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jidong Chen Jennifer Pan and Yiqing Xu, ‘Sources of Authoritarian 
Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China’, American Journal of Political Science 60:2 (2016), pp. 383-400. 
11 Baogang He and Mark Warren, ‘Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political 
Development’, Perspectives on Politics 9:2 (2011), pp. 269-289. 
12 Jessica Teets, Civil Society under Authoritarianism: The China Model (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014). 
13 Chen et al., ‘Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness’. 
14 See Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy 13:1 (2002), pp. 5-21. 
15 See Marc Morjé Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Debra Javeline and Sarah Lindemann-Komarova, ‘A Balanced Assessment of Russian 
Civil Society’, Journal of International Affairs 63:2 (2010), pp. 171-188; Elena Chebankova, Civil Society in 
Putin’s Russia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Leah Gilbert, ‘Crowding Out Civil Society: State Management of 
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endeavour, has obscured the emergence of other institutional innovations not captured by a 
democratisation framework.16 While some studies of China adopted the transition framework, 
they are far fewer than in the Russian case.  
 
The present article aims to redress this imbalance by developing a concept and small typology 
of associated practices of managing growing levels of civic participation in local governance, 
which appear in both states – and perhaps beyond. Hence, I choose the broader term 
‘participatory’, which captures the range of modes of citizen engagement from consultation 
and deliberation to delegation and co-production.17 While the China scholars discussed above 
have researched participation as a strategy of domestic regime survival, I highlight the 
significance of global trends in bringing about, shaping and mediating these strategies and their 
intertwining with local non-democratic traditions of government. Current literature has tended 
to assume that democratic norms promoted by international actors have a democratising 
influence on domestic regimes; I argue that the opposite is often the case.18 In Russia and China, 
practices of managed participation constitute local, non-democratic manifestations of global 
good governance trends.  
 
The comparative study of political processes in Russia and China is a small but growing field.19 
I seek to contribute to this field from an interpretive perspective, which departs from traditional 
 
Social Organisations in Putin’s Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies 68:9 (2016): pp. 1553-1578;  Yulia Skokova, Ulla 
Pape and Irina Krasnopolskaya, ‘The Non-profit Sector in Today’s Russia: Between Confrontation and Co-
optation’, Europe-Asia Studies 70:4 (2018), pp. 531-563. 
16 Important exceptions include Richard Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, 
Factionalism and the Medvedev Secession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Henry Hale, 
Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014); James Richter, ‘Putin and the Public Chamber’, Post-Soviet Affairs 25:1 (2009), pp. 39–65. 
17 Shelley Arnstein, ‘A Ladder of Citizen Participation’, Journal of American Planning Association 35:4 (1969), 
pp. 216-224. 
18 See Oisin Tansey, The International Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
pp. 26-29, for a review of this literature. 
19 Tomas Larsson, ‘Reform, corruption, and growth: Why corruption is more devastating in Russia than in 
China’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39:2 (2006), pp. 265-281; Linda Cook and Martin K. 
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approaches based on ‘controlled comparison’, that involve ‘either contrasting outcomes despite 
similar potentially explanatory characteristics or similar outcomes despite contrasting 
potentially explanatory characteristics’ [emphasis in original].20 As Simmons and Smith have 
argued, such an approach can over-emphasize the ability to control in comparative research 
designs in the social sciences and de-emphasise context and the importance of local meanings 
in the construction of the political.21 Instead, I follow the approach to comparison that Skocpol 
and Somers have termed ‘parallel demonstration of theory’. Here, ‘the point of the comparison 
is to assert a similarity among the cases – similarity, that is, in terms of the common 
applicability of the overall theoretical arguments.’22 For such an approach to be convincing and 
rigorous – and to avoid accusations of cherry-picking facts – in-depth knowledge of each case 
must be acquired, and comparison must start from ‘the [researcher’s] ability to make sense of 
the singularities of each system, rather than from the capacity either to slot them into 
predetermined boxes or place them on a continuum.’23  An interpretively oriented parallel 
demonstration of theory should seek to uncover locally situated meanings from which 
similarities across both cases can be highlighted and interpreted through the proposed 
theoretical framework.  
 
 
Dimitrov, ‘The Social Contract Revisited: Evidence from Communist and State Capitalist Economies’, Europe-
Asia Studies 69:1 (2017), pp. 8-26; Martin Krzywdzinski, Consent and Control in the Authoritarian Workplace: 
Russia and China Compared (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Ian  McAllister and Stephen White, 
‘Economic Change and Public Support for Democracy in China and Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 69:1 (2017), 
pp. 76-91; Alexander Libman and Michael Rochlitz, Federalism in China and Russia: Story of Success and 
Story of Failure? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019). 
20 Erica S. Simmons and Nicholas Rush Smith, ‘Comparison with an Ethnographic Sensibility’, PS: Political 
Science and Politics, 50:1 (2017), p. 127. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, ‘The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 22:2 (1980), pp. 176-177. 
23 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Culture Troubles: Politics and the Interpretation of Meaning 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 63. See also Dvora Yanow, ‘Interpretive Analysis and 
Comparative Research’ in Isabelle Engeli and Christine Rothmayr Allison (eds.) Comparative Policy Studies: 
Conceptual and Methodological Challenges (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014). 
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From this perspective, Russia and China are pertinent comparative cases for a theoretical 
elaboration of the relationship between bureaucratic transformation and citizen participation as 
they share two important similarities. First, both developed extensive state socialist 
bureaucracies, meaning that the introduction of market principles required a transformation of 
the relationship between citizens and government, from one based on universal entitlement to 
one based on individual need. This suggests that both governments’ domestic rhetoric are likely 
to share the goal of legitimating this transformation. Second, both states are largely non-
democratic at the national level (with no opportunities to elect leaders in China and limited 
opportunities in Russia) and freedoms of assembly and expression are curtailed. While my 
analysis seeks to maintain an appreciation of the unique political culture of each state – indeed, 
citizens’ experience of social control by the state in Russia and China differ enormously and is 
discussed below – my proposition or, following John Boswell and colleagues, my ‘plausible 
conjecture’, is that the common governance problems inherent in the process of bureaucratic 
transformation of non-democratic states are also inspiring local solutions with similarities.24 
These solutions seek to recruit citizens into the governing process but simultaneously limit and 
undermine their impact. In order to demonstrate this, I produce a small typology of practices 
that appear in both cases, which constitute participatory authoritarianism. The typology 
consists of, first, extending participatory opportunities while restricting who can participate 
and, second, engaging citizens in decision-making processes but undermining or distorting 
their input.  This helps us understand how local non-democratic leaders manage citizens’ 
involvement in local political processes as authoritarian government shifts towards governance.  
 
 
24 John Boswell and colleagues argue that the purpose of interpretive comparison is to form ‘plausible 
conjectures’ that ‘may or may not resonate beyond the immediate context in which they are initially developed’. 
See John Boswell, Jack Corbett and R. A. W. Rhodes, The Art and Craft of Comparison (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 43. 
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Comparative interpretive analysis is relatively rare, partly because of the difficulties in 
developing sufficient levels of ethnographic sensibility in more than one highly complex 
polity.25 I have sought to address this by spending more than two years living, working and 
conducting fieldwork in each country. Hence, the present article is based over 100 research 
interviews conducted during this time with local scholars, current and former members of local 
participatory bodies, as well as local officials in Russia and China. In Russia, my fieldwork has 
focussed on corporate deliberative and advisory bodies developed since 2005, such as public 
chambers (obchestvennye palaty) and public councils (obshchestvennye sovety), and, more 
recently, participatory budgeting initiatives (initsiativnoye byudzhetirovaniye).26 In China, my 
fieldwork has explored residents’ committees (juweihui), civic organisations aimed at 
enhancing participatory governance, and participatory budgeting initiatives (canyu shi yusuan). 
In both countries, I have conducted formal interviews and informal conversations with scholars 
working on participatory governance. While I do not cite all interviews in the present text, they 
inform my broader analysis and overall argumentation.  
 
This ethnographic orientation is supported by critical discourse analysis (CDA) of texts and 
speeches by political leaders, as well as relevant legal documents. On the Russian side, I 
accessed 10 annual Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly between 2008 and 2019, 
and Vladimir Putin’s seven pre-election articles outlining his domestic and foreign policy 
agendas prior to the March 2012 Presidential elections. The Presidential Address has been 
made annually since the adoption of the 1993 Constitution and is considered to deal with the 
‘state of the nation’; the pre-election articles were published in some of the country’s most 
 
25 Yanow, ‘Interpretive Analysis and Comparative Research’, p. 148. For a definition of ‘ethnographic 
sensibility’, see Edward Schatz (ed.) Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 5. 
26 These are composed partly of civic activists and partly of local government officials, which aim to mediate 
between different sections of society and promote civic harmony. See Richter, ‘Putin and the Public Chamber’.  
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respected broadsheets and were discussed extensively both in Russia and beyond. On the 
Chinese side, I accessed the programmatic speeches by Jiang Zemin,  Hu Jintao and, latterly, 
Xi Jinping, to the five-yearly National Party Congress (2002, 2007, 2013 and 2017), and two 
collections of Xi Jinping’s writings that now form Xi Jinping Thought.27 In the article’s second 
section, I examine how each leader constructs processes of change, how they describe the role 
of the citizen in governance and the institutions envisaged to inculcate this new role, and the 
legitimating narratives for the new relationship between citizens and the authorities. CDA 
complements my practice-based understanding of governance by emphasising the dialectical 
relationship between discursive change and the evolution of practices, and highlights how 
various types of practices may fuse together over time, as discourses are weaved together by 
political leaders to form legitimating narratives for these new practices.28 I suggest this is what 
has occurred with democratic practices of participation and authoritarian practices of control 
in the field of local governance in Russia and China. 
 
The essay comprises three sections. First, I set out the theoretical foundations of ‘participatory 
authoritarianism’ and delineate the typology of its constitutive practices. I suggest that the 
oppositional yet mutually reinforcing logics of openness and control found in these practices 
are essential for local governance in an era of late capitalism. Second, I explore Russian and 
Chinese governmental rhetoric on civic participation, arguing that the market transformation 
of state bureaucracy without the political transformation of government has required leaders to 
produce new vocabularies and narratives for the proliferating mechanisms of participatory 
governance in both states. Third, I trace the twin logics producing participatory 
authoritarianism in the legislation on local self-government in Russia and China, and illustrate 
 
27 Xi Jinping, The Governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014); Xi Jinping, The Governance 
of China, Volume 2, (Shanghai: Shanghai Press, 2018). 
28 Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2003), p. 24. 
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the typology of practices set out in the first section with evidence from my interviews. While 
some of these discussions may be familiar to scholars with expertise in one of the two countries, 
the article’s innovation lies in two areas. First, it draws these conclusions across both cases, 
demonstrating that the marketisation of bureaucracies presents a set of common challenges for 
non-democratic leaders that are being addressed through a common set of practices. And, 
second, it demonstrates how international norms of ‘good governance’ can be applied locally 
for quite different ends.  
 
Practices of Participatory Authoritarianism in the Era of Late Capitalism 
 
This section builds on the nascent body of work that takes a practice-based approach to the 
study of authoritarianism. 29  Schatzki defines a practice as ‘a set of doings and sayings 
organized by a pool of understandings, a set of rules.’30 Exploring practices of governance 
enables the researcher to explore the formation of political subjecthood through language, signs 
and discourse, accessing this subject through the ‘sets of patterned actions’ he/she engages in.31 
When applied to authoritarianism, it shifts the focus away from national regime type by 
suggesting that authoritarian practices exist within liberal democracies – and, by extension, that 
democratic practices may exist in one-party states – and aids an understanding of how various 
‘patterns of action’ reinforce or undermine political stability. 
 
 
29 Marlies Glasius, ‘What Authoritarianism is… And is Not: A Practice Perspective’, International Affairs 94:3 
(2018), pp. 515-533; Marlies Glasius, ‘Extraterritorial Authoritarian Practices: a Framework’, Globalizations 
15:2 (2017), pp. 179-197; Ben Wagner, ‘Understanding Internet Shutdowns: A Case Study from Pakistan’, 
International Journal of Communication 12:1 (2018), pp. 3917-3938. 
30 Theodore Schatzki, ‘Practice Mind-ed Orders’ in Theodore Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina and Eike von 
Savigny, eds., The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 53. 
31 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, ‘International Practices’, International Theory 3:1 (2011), p. 5. 
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Glasius argues that ‘authoritarian practices presuppose a downward relationship, where the 
political actor engaged in them has control over the people affected.’32 While the practices 
discussed below do presuppose such a relationship, they simultaneously presume an inclusive, 
pluralistic relationship. I seek to capture this Janus-faced nature of local governance in Russia 
and China by defining participatory authoritarianism as a set of practices by local governments 
in non-democratic states undergoing processes of bureaucratic marketisation that establishes 
avenues for citizens to engage voluntarily in policy processes, while simultaneously 
deliberately limiting, controlling or undermining the extent and impact of this engagement. 
These practices occur at the level of process and at the level of outcome and hence take two 
forms: first, widening citizens’ participation in policy processes, while either vetting potential 
participants to ensure access only to compliant individuals or ejecting participants during the 
event for airing inappropriate opinions; and second, conducting a participatory event, but 
deemphasising its results by privately making the relevant decisions beforehand or drastically 
watering down any transformative potential in the follow-up legislation. These two practices, 
illustrated in the third section, occur in an institutional setting (what Schatzki termed ‘pool of 
understandings’) in which civic participation is simultaneously encouraged and promoted – 
often as a panacea for the state’s many problems – but, rather than inviting citizens to help 
shape the agenda, conceives their role primarily as assisting local authorities in the execution 
of centrally determined tasks.  
 
Participatory practices have existed in authoritarian states long before the implementation of 
market reforms. In China, the Maoist concept of the ‘mass line’, which refers to ‘a close and 
direct relationship between the Party and the masses’, enables citizens to interact with local 
 
32 Glasius, ‘What Authoritarianism is… And is Not’, p. 527. 
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officials who are obliged to respond to complaints and resolve disputes in a timely fashion.33 
Mass line ideology has been invoked by scholars to interpret China’s participatory mechanisms 
since Mao, which range from evaluating draft legislation and writing letters to officials34 to the 
high levels of protest since 1990s.35 In the late Soviet period, officials gathered public opinion 
by analysing complaint letters and conducting opinion polls36 and ‘citizen inspectors’ played 
monitory roles during policy implementation.37 Hahn has concluded that ‘the image of Soviet 
citizens as passive recipients of government policies and stoic and uncomplaining subjects 
lacking legitimate opportunities or the inclination to contest and shape the decisions that affect 
their lives is inaccurate, at least at the local level’.38 Hence, the idea advanced below is not that 
participation under authoritarianism is a new phenomenon, but that the nature of participation 
under authoritarianism is changing as domestic state functions shift away from direct service 
provision and towards regulation. Feedback mechanisms that have not grown out of 
bureaucratic transformations remain in both Russia and China, and continue to reproduce 
traditional state-society dynamics, which assume a citizenry dependent on the state for welfare 
and are embodied in practices such as petitioning, polling and complaint-making. 39  But 
mechanisms are emerging that seek to inculcate new forms of active citizenship, whereby 
citizens voluntarily provide knowledge and expertise to local officials, such as participatory 
 
33 Tang, ‘Populist Authoritarianism’, p. 6. 
34 James Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1987), p. 80. 
35 Xi, Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China, p. 14. 
36 Martin Dimitrov, ‘Tracking Public Opinion under Authoritarianism’, Russian History 41:3 (2014), pp. 329-
353. 
37 Jan Adams, Citizen Inspectors in the Soviet Union: The People's Control Committee (New York: Praeger, 
1977). 
38 Jeffrey Hahn, Soviet Grassroots: Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), p. 262. 
39 Putin’s annual ‘direct line’ and China’s ‘Mayors Mailbox’ are examples of mechanisms that reproduce 
traditional state-society relations. Similarly, scholars note the role of complaint-making as a form of feedback in 
both countries (see Laura Henry, ‘Complaint-making as Political Participation in Contemporary Russia’, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45:3-4 (2012), pp. 243-254; Luehrmann, ‘Facing Citizen Complaints 
in China’). However, these mechanisms predate market transformations and do not seek to cultivate ‘active 
citizens’ of the type described below, hence I do not explore them here. 
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budgeting, participatory pricing and new deliberative fora, but simultaneously limit their 
capacity to effect change. I now consider this proposition in more detail. 
 
In democracies and non-democracies, participatory mechanisms have become more important 
following the adoption of market principles into state bureaucracies. Beginning in the UK, 
USA and New Zealand during the late 1970s and early 1980s, national governments around 
the world have introduced principles drawn from the private sector into domestic public sectors 
in an ensemble of norms known as New Public Management (NPM). These include the 
privatisation of state-owned assets, devolution of executive power to the provincial or 
municipal levels, outsourcing of government functions to businesses and charitable 
organisations, and monetisation and means-testing of welfare. 40  The result has been a 
government-driven departure from the so-called ‘command and control’ states of the twentieth 
Century, which provided welfare directly to citizens, and towards types of regulatory states, 
which engage instead in ‘arms’ length governance’ through fragmented, decentralised and 
internationalised agencies.41 In regulatory states, governments are no longer the primary source 
of the knowledge and resources required for the effective policy-making and delivery; 
consequently, they must establish mechanisms that allow them to access this knowledge and 
resources in order to manage and oversee the policy process. Citizens are encouraged to 
become active in local governance since the state is no longer considered capable of fulfilling 
the task of welfare and service provision alone. 42  Institutions of what Keane has termed 
 
40 Giandomenico Majone, ‘From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in 
the Mode of Governance’, Journal of Public Policy 17:2 (1997), pp.139-167. See also Jamie Peck, 
Constructions of Neoliberal Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 23; Norman Flynn, Public 
Sector Management, 5th Edition, (London: Sage, 2007), p. 204. 
41 Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, ‘Global Governance as State Transformation’, Political Studies, 64:4 (2016), 
p. 795. For how these transformations are occurring beyond the West, see Navroz Dubash and Bronwen Morgan 
(eds.), The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South: Infrastructure and Development in Emerging Economies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
42 Eric Swyngedouw, ‘Governance Innovation and the Citizen: The Janus Face of Governance-Beyond-the-
State’, Urban Studies 42:11 (2005), pp. 1991-2006; Jon Pierre, Jon and B. Guy Peters, Governance, Politics and 
the State, (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 2000). 
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‘monitory democracy’ have sprung up alongside elections to extend citizen input into ever 
wider spheres of state power.43 In non-democratic regulatory states, consultative, deliberative 
and other types of participatory mechanisms are all the more important in light of the absence 
or malfunctioning of other feedback channels.  
 
This process of marketisation has fundamentally changed in the way in which governments 
around the world conceive of the role of citizens in the governing process, affecting the design 
of participatory institutions and how they are represented to citizens in public discourse. In 
regulatory states, citizen ‘consumers’ of government services must be able to make rational 
and informed choices about their needs, and their preferences must be accessed by policy-
makers to ensure services are developed to meet those needs.44 Further, since the fragmentation 
and decentralisation of formerly centralised state agencies have resulted in private businesses 
and third sector organisations delivering frontline services, the inclusion of citizens and non-
state service providers into policy processes has become an important means for policy-makers 
to garner requisite knowledge.45  In short, the role of the citizen in society is transforming as 
the role of the state shifts away from direct service provision and towards regulation. This new 
active citizen should be a flexible, resilient, entrepreneurial consumer of public services, able 
to make informed choices about the services she and her family need.46 The task of local 
governments then becomes the production and curation of this form of citizenship, which is 
blended with pre-existing norms and traditions of political culture. One of the ways in which 
this occurs is through practices of participatory authoritarianism. 
 
43 John Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (London: Simon and Schuster, 2009). 
44 John Clarke, Janet Newman, Nick Smith, Elizabeth Vidler and Louise Westmarland, Creating Citizen 
Consumers: Changing Public and Changing Public Services, (London: Sage, 2007). 
45 Frank Vibert, The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of Powers (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); John Keane, Power and Humility: The Future of Monitory Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2018). 
46 Wendy Brown, ‘Sacrificial Citizenship: Neoliberalism, Human Capital and Identity Politics’, Constellations 





In their seminal 1963 work, Almond and Verba argued that the kind of citizen required in a 
democracy was an ‘allegiant’ one, ‘oriented positively to the input structures and the input 
process’.47 By contrast, in authoritarian states, ‘it is essentially a passive relationship’.48  Fifty 
years later, in a reassessment of Almond and Verba’s study, Welzel and Dalton argue that 
global political culture is shifting towards a more empowered, ‘assertive’ citizen who voices 
concerns and is critical of her government. They write, ‘In contrast to the allegiant citizen of 
the past, contemporary publics more often combine a deep normative commitment to 
democratic ideals with dissatisfaction on how governments fulfil these ideals’. Even in non-
democratic states, they observe this trend: ‘These patterns are most evident in mature, post-
industrial democracies but are also emerging in the political cultures of those developing 
nations in which living conditions are rapidly improving’.49 Manifestations of this trend can be 
observed in Russia and China’s changing social strata. 
 
I conclude this discussion by highlighting two important ways in which the concept of 
participatory authoritarianism enhances our understanding of local governance in Russia and 
China. First, it contributes to a practice-based understanding of citizenship in contemporary 
non-democratic contexts – a concept whose notions of rights and responsibilities has led to its 
neglect in studies of authoritarianism.50 Uncovering practices of participatory authoritarianism 
can reveal how local governments develop controlled forms of active citizenship, which 
 
47 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations 
(London: Sage, 1989 [1963]), p. 30. 
48 Ibid., p. 19. 
49 Russell Dalton and Christian Welzel, Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 287. 
50 This gap was highlighted by Greg Distelhorst and Diana Fu, ‘Performing Authoritarian Citizenship: Public 
Transcripts in China’, Perspectives on Politics 17:1 (2019), pp.106-121. 
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enables effective policy-making, contributes to stable domestic governance and adheres to 
international norms.  
 
Secondly, participatory authoritarianism posits a more theoretically nuanced account of the 
relationship between democratic practices of openness and accountability and authoritarian 
practices of control and arbitrariness. Rather than a simple ‘corruption’ or ‘distortion’ of 
democratic norms and practices, participatory authoritarianism highlights their intertwined and 
co-constitutive nature. It conceives of local democratic and authoritarian practices as coexisting 
in an on-going dialogical relationship with one another, each being implemented in response 
to the situation created by the implementation of the other.51 In contrast to the process inherent 
within Hegelian dialectics, a dialogical process does not presume a resolution or synthesis – 
there is no ultimate attainment of (or transition to) a final ideal state. Instead, a dialogical 
relationship sees democratic and authoritarian logics co-existing simultaneously, constantly 
interacting and evolving in response to one another, and producing sets of practices that reflect 
and embody these dynamics as they change over time.  In this way, it inverses the Foucauldian 
insight that liberal-democratic governance is parasitic upon authoritarian practices by 
suggesting that contemporary authoritarian governance similarly requires democratic practices 
in order to produce the required political subjectivities.52 It also is distinct from conceptions of 
hybridity since no novel ‘third space’ is attained: the two components remain discrete analytical 
elements.53 As Pieterse observed, critics of hybridity argue that it is ‘meaningful only as a 
critique of essentialism.’54 While this critique has been well made in Cultural Studies,55 it has 
 
51 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist 
(Austin, TA: University of Austin Press, 1981). 
52 Barry Hindess, ‘The Liberal Government of Unfreedom’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 26:2 (2001), 
p. 104; Trent Hamann ‘Neoliberalism, Governmentality and Ethics’, Foucault Studies 6:42 (2009), pp. 37-59. 
53 Homi K. Bhabha The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 54-55. 
54 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ‘Hybridity… So What? The Anti-Hybridity Backlash and the Riddles of 
Recognition’, Theory, Culture and Society 18: 2-3 (2001) p. 222. 




not yet penetrated studies of political regimes, where boundary fetishism remains a 
methodological imperative. But what the rigorous reinforcement of boundaries in the study of 
democracy and authoritarianism misses is an appreciation of how these two sets of practices 
operate alongside one another, sustaining and reinforcing one another. The remaining sections 
show how internationally promoted democratic norms intertwine with domestic authoritarian 
logics both at the level of state discourse and at the level of local legislation in contemporary 
Russia and China to produce practices of participatory authoritarianism. 
 
Good Governance and Participatory Authoritarianism in Russia and China 
 
Numerous scholars note the globally embedded nature of domestic bureaucratic 
transformations.56 Jayasuria argues that the essential context for domestic institutional change 
lies within ‘systems of transnational markets and rule-making’. 57  And, following Soviet 
collapse in Russia and the instigation of China’s reform period under Deng Xiaoping, leaders 
began to engage with Western economists and policy advisors, and integrating into various 
intergovernmental bodies that promote governance reform. 58  Thus, both leaderships were 
encouraged and, sometimes, required to reflect on and implement recommendations for 
transforming governance structures. This section highlights Russian and Chinese interactions 
with international institutions promoting good governance and active citizenship during their 
respective periods of domestic reform, and explores how these norms have been represented in 
government discourses. Here, I utilise CDA, which reveals how discourse sustains relations of 
 
56 Witold Henisz, Bennet Zelner and Mauro Guillén, ‘The Worldwide Diffusion of Market-Oriented 
Infrastructure Reform, 1977-1999’, American Sociological Review 70:6 (2005), pp. 871-897; Jacint Jordana, 
David Levi-Faur and Xavier Fernández-i-Marín, ‘The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies; Channels of 
Transfer and Stages of Diffusion’, Comparative Political Studies 44:10 (2011), pp. 1343-1369. 
57 Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Regulatory State with Dirigiste Characteristics: Variegated Pathways of Regulatory 
Governance’ in Dubash and Morgan, The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South, p. 185. 
58 Julian Gewirtz, Unlikely Partners: Chinese Reformers, Western Economists and the Making of Global China 
(Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017); Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2002). 
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power and domination, to analyse the relationship between economic reform, democracy and 
the citizen articulated the speeches and written texts by the Russian and Chinese leadership. 59 
The analysis shows that while both consider it important and necessary to open their 
bureaucracies to the market and enhance the role of the citizen in local governance, a similar 
opening of domestic political systems is considered a separate and highly undesirable issue. 
Mechanisms involving participatory authoritarianism thus constitute a central means by which 
the contradictions of the marketisation of state bureaucracies in non-democratic political 
regimes are managed in practice. 
 
Numerous evidence exists for the integration of Russia and China into global networks that 
promote good governance and public sector reform, although Russia – as the more Western-
facing – has achieved this to a greater degree. In 1999, the Russian government ratified the 
Council of Europe’s European Charter of Local Self-Government, which committed 
signatories to ‘applying basic rules guaranteeing the political, administrative and financial 
independence of local authorities’.60 In China, the dismantling of the cradle-to-grave social 
security system, the ‘iron rice bowl’, was a condition of joining the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 200161; in Russia, the streamlining of the Soviet-era public sector was instigated as 
Vladimir Putin became president in 2000 and the economic turmoil of the 1990s subsided.62 In 
2005, the United Nations’ Sixth Global Forum on Reinventing Government in Seoul 2005 saw 
148 states, including Russia and China, sign the Seoul Declaration on Participatory and 
Transparent Governance, which linked good governance directly to market-oriented public 
 
59 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language, Second Edition (London: 
Routledge, 1995). 
60 Council of Europe (1985) ‘European Charter of Local Self Government’. Available at: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/122  
61 Neil Hughes, China’s Economic Challenge: Smashing the Iron Rice Bowl (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002). 
62 Linda Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States: Reform Politics in Russia and Eastern Europe (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 1-5. 
20 
 
sector reform and encouraged signatories to adapt domestic bureaucracy to facilitate economic 
competition.63 As stipulations by the WTO require transparency in trade-related regulations, 
policies of open government have been adopted in Russia and China,64 a trend that has been 
explicitly linked to the development of participatory governance.65 Local governments in both 
countries are members of the international organisation that promotes local self-government, 
United Cities and Local Governments. 66  The World Bank has been extremely active in 
promoting local government reform, both structurally and fiscally: in Russia, its Local 
Initiative’s Support Program has trained local officials and provided technical assistance to 
increase civic participation in municipal decision-making67; while in China, projects have 
focussed on healthcare and local budget reform. 68  World Bank participatory budgeting 
initiatives have also be conducted in both countries.  
 
At the same time, many of these externally promoted norms have been modified and 
rearticulated in the domestic rhetoric of government leadership. While the terms ‘government’ 
and ‘governance’ have the same translation in Russian (upravlenie), the idea that the governing 
process is not the sole preserve of state officials has been a common theme under Putin. During 
his presidency, he has continually espoused a normative commitment to the development of 
non-electoral participatory mechanisms, claiming that a turbulent international environment 
 
63 ‘The Seoul Declaration on Participatory and Transparent Governance’, 27 May 2005. Available at: 
http://www.i-p-o.org/GF6-Seoul_Declaration-27May05.htm.  
64 Jamie Horsely, ‘Towards a More Open China?’ in Ann Florini (ed.) The Right To Know (New York: 
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Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 32:1 (2013), pp. 172-185; ‘Unleashing the Potential of Open Data 
in Russia’, World Bank, 13 January 2015. Available at: 
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and the unstoppable forces of globalization require innovative policies for harnessing citizens’ 
agency in the service of national development.69 For Putin, market-oriented transformations in 
state bureaucracy require citizens to engage in governance, since ‘welfare hand-outs without 
taking responsibility for one’s actions are simply no longer possible in the 21st century.’70 New 
deliberative mechanisms have been proliferating since the inception of the Federal Public 
Chamber in 2005, producing regional, municipal and even district-level public chambers. Putin 
has personally supported a number of initiatives promoting active citizenship, including the All 
Russian People’s Front, a large, amorphous civic union, of which he is the figurehead and 
whose aim is ‘to provide every person with a chance to create, to build a great country, a great 
Russia’. 71  In his speeches to the Federal Assembly, Putin frequently calls upon this 
organisation to take the lead in executing a variety of social tasks, including conducting civilian 
oversight of environmental issues72 and monitoring citizens’ access to healthcare.73 In May 
2018, he signed Presidential Decree No. 204, stating that by 2024 local governments should 
‘create a mechanism for direct citizen participation in the formation of a comfortable urban 
environment, and increase the number of citizens participating in solving urban development 
issues by up to 30 percent’.74  
 
 
69 Catherine Owen, ‘A Genealogy of Kontrol’ in Russia: From Leninist to Neoliberal Governance’, Slavic 
Review 75:2 (2016), pp. 331-353. 
70 Vladimir Putin, ‘Rossiya Sosredotachivayetsya: Vyzovy, Na Kotoryye My Dolzhny Otvetit’’, Izvestiya, 16 
January 2012. Available at: http://izvestia.ru/news/511884. While Russian leaders pay lip service to the concept 
of civil society (grazhdanskoe obshchestvo), legislative developments have divided non-profit organisations into 
Foreign Agents, who receive funding from abroad and engage in political activity, and Socially Oriented NGOs 
which may compete for government funding to provide welfare services. The latter are now the legitimate face 
of independent civic activity, while the former are considered unpatriotic at best and enemies of the people at 
worst. 
71 ‘Putin Agrees to Head All-Russia People’s Front’, RT, 12 June 2013. Available at: 
https://www.rt.com/russia/putin-all-russia-front-600/.  
72 ‘Poslaniye Prezidenta Federal'nomu Sobraniyu’, Kremlin.ru, 20 February 2019. Available at: 
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An analogous trend is observable in Chinese rhetoric, with leadership transforming its 
vocabulary to reflect global shifts in approaches to government. In the latter half of the 1980s, 
the idea of the ‘three selfs’ became prominent in government discourse to legitimise 
government restructuring: self-management, self-education and self-service. This re-iteration 
of ‘self’ reinforces the globally promoted neoliberal idea of resilient and self-reliant citizenship 
mentioned above. As Howell notes, ‘it signals a more indirect role for the state whereby it 
regulates rather than commands, paralleling the direction of market reforms’.75 In the early 
2000s, the slogan ‘Small Government, Large Society’ was coined to promote the downsizing 
of the public sector.76 Around the same time, the concept of ‘orderly participation’ [you xu 
canyu] – now a central concept in Chinese governance – first appeared in government discourse. 
The new role of government considered to be to ‘lead citizens to manage themselves according 
to the law [yindao renmin qunzhong yifa guanli ziji de shiqing].’77 ‘Orderly participation’ was 
repeated in Jiang Zemin’s 2002 Party Congress report,78 in Hu Jintao’s report five years later,79 
and most recently in Xi Jinping’s 2017 speech to the 19th Party Congress. Across the three 
speeches, the idea that the role of government should be to nurture citizens’ self-management 
is repeatedly emphasised, expanded upon and linked to ‘orderly participation’ in governance – 
already by 2006, Sigley had noted a ‘shift in vocabulary and conceptualization within Chinese 
 
75 Jude Howell, ‘Adaptation under Scrutiny: Peering Through the Lens of Community Governance in China’, 
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discourse from a notion of “government” (zhengfu) as a task of “planning” (jihua) and 
“administration” (xingzheng) to one that involves “management” (guanli) and “governance” 
(zhili).’80 Xi’s 2017 speech goes further to emphasise his administration’s commitment to the 
establishment of a regulatory state in China: ‘The government needs to transform its functions, 
further streamline administration and delegate powers, develop new ways of regulation and 
supervision… building itself into a service-oriented government’. 81  
 
While both leaders embrace this new, NPM-inspired approach to state functions, Putin82 and 
Xi83 claim that external political models cannot be imposed upon the societies they govern, and 
leaders and analysts have developed new conceptualisations of democracy. In Russia, the 
concept of ‘managed democracy’ entered the political lexicon in the early 2000s, seeking to 
capture the way in which political competition is controlled, or ‘managed’, by the country’s 
leaders in order to ensure stability.84 Around the same time, the term ‘sovereign democracy’ 
was evoked by Kremlin strategist Vladislav Surkov, underscoring Russia’s independence from 
foreign incursions, following the Colour Revolutions sweeping the post-Soviet space.85 In 
China, the term ‘consultative’ or ‘deliberative’ (xieshang) democracy appears in government 
discourse to capture the role of the citizen in China’s one-party state.  According to CCP 
theorists, socialist deliberative democracy is unique to China and stems from mass line 
ideology, and involves ‘conducting extensive consultations before and after decision-making, 
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and striving to form a consensus’.86 This attempt to maintain a clear ideological thread to the 
Maoist period contrasts with the dramatic bureaucratic reforms undertaken since that period, 
but is vital for the CCP’s claims to legitimacy in an era of regulatory statehood. Clearly, the 
Russian and Chinese reformulations of democracy are very different, emerging from each 
state’s unique historical context and geopolitical circumstances; however, they share the 
common purpose of legitimating the combination of democratising practices of openness and 
pluralism with the authoritarian practices of control and monism. 
 
As mentioned, pre-existing political cultures and meanings frame the legitimation of new 
conceptualisations. In the two countries, tensions exist in this sphere. In China, new models of 
active citizenship fit well with the mass line, which allows Chinese leaders to present new 
modes of participation as a continuation of Chinese socialism and a means of ‘national 
rejuvenation’.87 However, as Howell notes, ‘The Leninist notion of an elite vanguard of Party 
workers collides with the more democratic notion of active citizenship’.88 Thus, party leaders 
must balance the promotion of active citizenship with the CCP’s leading role in society. 
Promoting participatory authoritarianism is one way of doing this. The Russian case is more 
challenging still: Soviet collapse left Russia bereft of a legitimating ideology for these tools 
(and for governance in general). It is therefore harder for Russian leadership to justify them, 
and leaves them open to criticism as ‘Potemkin villages’ and ‘window dressing’.89 Becoming 
active in local governance is consistently framed in Putin’s speeches to the Federal Assembly 
as a patriotic duty in the face of a challenging global environment. Thus, domestic rhetoric has 
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not simply reproduced global discourses, but has attempted to incorporate them into extant 
traditions and narratives of governance.  
 
In Russia and China, leaders share the global commitment to transforming government 
functions away from direct welfare provision and towards forms of regulatory statehood, while 
eschewing the forms of political pluralism that have accompanied this transformation in the 
West. Yet, as discussed above, this shift from government to governance requires mechanisms 
for citizen participation: without such mechanisms, regulation-oriented governments are 
unable to formulate effective policy or ensure that it is delivered. Practices of participatory 
authoritarianism enable governments to elicit citizens’ views without affecting overall non-
democratic political stability.  
 
Institutions and Practices of Participatory Authoritarianism in Russia and China 
 
In international policy-oriented parlance, the regulation and development of government-
organised mechanisms of participatory governance falls under the umbrella of local self-
government (hereafter LSG), and has been substantially reshaped in both countries following 
market reforms.90 Distinguished from more independent, ‘unauthorised’ forms of participation, 
such as demonstrations, pickets and some autonomous civic groups, 91  which may be 
considered as belonging to civil society, LSG is an important feature of local political 
organisation in both countries, and includes practices such as public hearings and consultations, 
 
90 As Himsworth notes, the term ‘local self-government’ sounds cumbersome in English, with the reflexive form 
‘self’-government seeming superfluous. However, it was incorporated to highlight the active role of citizens and 
the autonomy from central government; hence, I follow the usage of this term as it has been translated. Chis 
Himsworth, The European Charter of Local Self-Government: A Treaty for Local Democracy, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2015). 
91 Kanishka Jayasuriya and Garry Rodan, ‘Beyond Hybrid Regimes: More Participation, Less Contestation in 
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monitory activities, participatory budgeting, and participatory pricing. Some of these, such as 
hearings and monitory activities, embody traditional state-society relations, since officials 
retain full control of the agenda and citizens occupy a supplicant role. Some, such as 
participatory budgeting, some types of consultations, and participatory pricing,  require new 
forms of active citizenship as citizens is conceived as a designer of policy outcomes and 
government control is partially – but only partially – ceded. This section traces the legislative 
development of LSG in Russia and China, and illustrates the two practices of participatory 
authoritarianism outlined in the first section. It reveals the emergence of new mechanisms that 
combine democratic and authoritarian practices, which enable officials to acknowledge citizens’ 
political agency while harnessing it in service of state-directed projects.  
 
The development of LSG has taken diverse trajectories in Russia and China, not least thanks 
to the differing relationships between central and sub-national governments. In China, central 
government encourages local authorities to engage in policy experimentations in what 
Heilmann calls ‘experimentation under hierarchy.92 Promotion for local cadres often depends 
on their capacity to develop innovative government mechanisms.93 Hence, the development of 
participatory mechanisms has taken a locally multifarious trajectory, with some cities, such as 
Hangzhou and Shanghai, becoming national leaders in participatory innovations, while others, 
such as Xi’an, lacking such developments.94 This means that although Russia is a federation, 
composed of relatively autonomous ‘federal subjects’, greater homogeneity in governance 
practices exists across Russia’s regions and municipalities, owing to Putin’s policies of 
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recentralisation during the 2000s.95  It is therefore far easier to generalise about LSG in Russia 
than in China, since the diversity of practices in the latter is vast. I now consider the legislative 
development in each case. 
 
Russia’s institutions of LSG were created during the early post-Soviet period during something 
of a golden era for local governance. Article 12 of the 1993 Constitution states:  ‘Local self-
government shall be independent within the limits of its authority. The bodies of local self-
government shall not be part of the system of bodies of state authority’.96 In short, LSG should 
operate independently from state bureaucracy, becoming the primary site for citizens to engage 
in local politics. Opinions diverge on what this relationship means in practice: total 
independence from the state; a hybrid expression of civil society delivering government 
services; or a pragmatic limitation of government intervention in local politics.97 However, 
researchers agree that the combination of sub-national political hierarchies, complicated 
legislation and public apathy has stymied the development of an independent LSG.98  
 
The three primary national-level legislative documents for the development of Russian LSG 
are the 1995 Federal Law 154 ‘On the General Principles of the Organization of Local Self-
Government’99; the 2003 Federal Law 131 ‘On the Organisation of Local Self Government’100; 
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and the 2014 Federal Law 212-FZ  ‘On the Basis of Public Control in the Russian 
Federation’.101 In each, the dual logics of openness and control are evident. For instance, the 
1995 law devolved responsibility for the regulation of LSG to the regional level. However, 
studies show that these reforms intended to enhance LSG actually resulted their subordination 
to the regional authorities.102  It also resulted in a wide variety of local legislative arrangements, 
many of which undermined the principle of independence set out in the Constitution.103 The 
2003 law sought to minimise this heterogeneity and, while it delineates the organisational form 
of territories of LSG in a manner that can be universally applied, Chapter Five specifies the 
forms that civic participation can take, including a local referendum, municipal elections, a 
citizens’ meeting or conference, a citizens’ lawmaking initiative, public hearings, public 
debates, polls, and citizens' appeals to local governments. Some of these, such as polls, hearings 
and appeals, replicate Soviet-era state-society dynamics, but others, such as law-making 
initiatives and debates, seek to foment this more active citizenship, which was developed in the 
2014 legislation. 
 
This 2014 law has had the greatest effect for LSG as facilitating practices of participatory 
authoritarianism in Russia. It extended and elaborated the developing network of participatory 
mechanisms, specifying their organisation, their outputs and the government’s response. Such 
mechanisms include holding a public examination (obshchestvennaya ekspertiza), whereby 
local civic experts study draft laws and assess their societal impact, and conducting public 
inspections (obshchestvennye proverki), in which monitory bodies staffed by members of the 
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public collect information on government bodies considered to be poorly performing and 
develop remedial proposals. Importantly, each of these mechanisms are linked to public 
chambers, public councils and other corporate bodies, which de facto undermines the critical 
or pluralistic potential of participation, predisposing them to upholding the status quo. At the 
same time, this law has been widely criticized as contradicting large swathes of existing 
legislation, and being extremely difficult to implement.104  Local scholars and activists in 
Russia admitted to not understanding the differences between the various types of participatory 
mechanism or how they should be implemented in practice.105  This means that while there is 
extensive legislation governing local civic participation in Russia, in practice, these activities 
tend to be ad hoc, open to change and easily manipulable. 
 
In China, LSG as a form of local political management is enshrined in the Constitution (its 
current version dating to 1982). Article 111 of Section Five states that the most local form of 
urban government, the residents’ committees, should ensure ‘people’s mediation, public 
security, public health and other matters in order to manage public affairs and social services 
in their areas, mediate civil disputes, help maintain public order and convey residents’ opinions 
and demands and make suggestions to the people’s government’.106 The Constitution states 
that committee’s chairpersons and deputies should be directly elected by the residents; however, 
interview respondents indicated that the most appropriate people for the job are often selected 
in an uncompetitive process. 107  At the same time, unlike the Russian legislation, the 
institutional forms that local governance should take are not specified, which has enabled 
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30 
 
authorities in China to experiment with innovations in community governance. Also, unlike 
Russia, there is no official database or website that holds all Chinese legislation, and they are 
scattered across different areas of government. Hence, given the vast regional variations and 
the limitations of space, I focus here on the expansion of residents committees (juweihui) as a 
participatory innovation developed directly in response to market-oriented bureaucratic 
transformation, which extends across all urban areas in China and through which other 
grassroots participatory activities are often organized. 
 
Prior to reform, urban Chinese citizens were organised into socialist work units known as 
danwei, which were attached to State-Owned Enterprises and through which welfare including 
housing, medical care, pensions and subsidies for food and transport were distributed to 
employees. As market reforms were introduced in 1980s, the bulk of local welfare provision 
was shifted from the danwei to the local community – in particular, to local residents’ 
committees. This entailed a profound transformation in the relationship between citizens and 
local government, and innovations in community governance were developed as a response to 
the void left by this sudden withdrawal of state-organised social provision.108 Article 2 of the 
1989 ‘Law of the Organization of Residents’ Committee’, which delineated residents’ 
committees new role in decentralised governance, defines them as ‘a grass-roots autonomous 
organization for the realization of residents’ self-management, self-education and self-
service’.109 In 2000, Beijing became concerned about the social and ideological void left by the 
dismantling of the danwei system, and tasked the Ministry of Civil Affairs with developing 
initiatives to revitalise local communities and strengthen Party control. It published a document 
stating that community building work was a ‘crucial tool in national efforts to promote social 
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development, to raise living standards, to expand grass-roots democracy and to maintain urban 
stability’.110 Local residents’ committees were designated as one of the central actors in this 
process, and should encourage citizens to participate in local governance at the street level by 
organizing voluntary and socially relevant activities.111 It is mostly at this street level, with the 
help of residents’ committees, that various experimental participatory activities have taken 
place, such as participatory budgeting initiatives, as it is here that is considered to form the 
basis for the construction of support for the Party-state.112 Thus, unlike in Russia, the presence 
of the ruling party is felt even at the grassroots level, and residents’ committees members are 
pre-selected and should also be members of the CCP.113   
 
Despite these greater levels of penetration into society by the Party-state, examples abound of 
the development of new participatory mechanisms in various cities and city-districts in China, 
including participatory budgeting initiatives, the use of local government offices as open 
forums to garner citizens’ policy proposals, and the development of ‘open-style government’ 
in which city officials establish an advisory group composed of civic experts to conduct 
oversight and provide expert input.114 At the same time, their democratizing potential must not 
be overstated – these mechanisms are only advisory in nature, and are usually dominated by 
the local CCP members. I now turn to an elucidation of the practices of participatory 
authoritarianism that are being produced through these various mechanisms of LSG in Russia 
and China.115 
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The first practice, which occurs at the level of process, involves local officials widening 
citizens’ participation in policy processes, while deliberately limiting the democratizing 
potential, for example by vetting potential participants to ensure access only to compliant 
individuals or ejecting participants during the event for airing inappropriate opinions. This 
means that citizens with a background of activism are often excluded, while explicitly ‘pro-
regime’ individuals or apolitical celebrities are admitted.116  One respondent in Samara, Russia, 
explained, ‘The method of selection is to a large extent controlled. Firstly people don’t choose 
the candidates they want, but the candidates they are told to choose… Or they choose the people 
whose names they recognise. I don’t really believe in the selection process.’117 City activists 
with particular expertise (for instance, accessibility for disabled people or recycling initiatives) 
may be invited to represent their cause in policy forums and initiatives, but if their participation 
is considered too antagonistic, the invitation may be withdrawn.118 Respondents in Russia 
suspected that some participants were specially planted by local officials to disrupt the 
proceedings or ensure the outcomes desired by the government.119 In China, participants should 
ideally be CCP members and are nearly always vetted by local officials before they can take 
part.120 In both cases, tales abound of individuals whose invitation to participate was withdrawn 
after they aired opinions deemed overly critical.121  
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The second practice, occurring at the level of outcome, involves local officials conducting a 
participatory event, but de-emphasising its results, for example by privately making the 
relevant decisions beforehand, drastically watering down any transformative potential in the 
follow-up legislation or using a heavily engineered participatory event to justify broader public 
policy decisions. In China’s participatory pricing initiatives (explicitly developed to manage 
the transition to a market economy), decisions are sometimes already made before citizens are 
invited to deliberate.122 One Hangzhou-based interviewee explained, ‘Why do governments 
hold participatory activities? They want to show that the public supports their activities. People 
will complain less if they are invited to talk to the government.’123 In participatory budgeting 
initiatives in both Russia and China, local officials reserve the right to deselected projects 
deemed inappropriate.124 In the case of Russian participatory institutions, members are under 
no illusions regarding the limitations of their influence, believing they have leverage in some, 
relatively marginal or apolitical areas but not in others considered to be of strategic 
importance.125 In both cases, new deliberative or consultative initiatives are formally advisory, 
meaning that local governments can easily disregard inconvenient recommendations. Yet 
citizens are not always ignored – research on participatory institutions in both states 
demonstrate that they do have limited impact on policy outcomes. 126  One member of a 
participatory body in Samara recalled, ‘There have been three instances so far in the Public 
Budget Council when they took the societal experts’ advice either in full or in part.’127 Since 
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the council’s term is normally three years, this would amount to adopting citizens’ 
recommendations once a year. 
 
Despite this similar approach to curating participatory governance, Russia and China evince 
very different state-society relations: studies report consistently high levels of trust in public 
institutions among Chinese citizens128, while in Russia the opposite is the case.129 This stark 
contrast was reflected in the way participants framed their engagement in interviews: in China, 
it was seen as an important patriotic duty, with some invoking Xi Jinping’s pronouncements 
on participation,130  while in Russia, a majority reported disappointment and frustration with 
the way in which the authorities interacted with them. One citizen explained, ‘I really saw some 
officials who were not so stereotypical, who were really willing to make some changes and to 
make this project work, and that was refreshing, but most of them, I’m afraid, are 
stereotypical!’131  Stemming from this, government-organised participatory bodies China tend 
to be guided and delimited from above by Party-oriented organisations, remain closely tied to 
the CCP, and reflect the overall dominant position of the local state in society. In this context, 
participatory authoritarianism represents something of an opening-up for policy-making 
processes in China. 132 In Russia, however, analogous bodies in part aim to mitigate the dire 
relations between state and society. In the words of one senior St Petersburg official, ‘[citizens’] 
loyalty to the government is in a very sad position – they don’t like the government, but they 
hate it.’133 Thus practices of participatory authoritarianism in Russia seek to tone down – or 
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This article has presented the concept of participatory authoritarianism, and its small typology 
of practices, as a means for understanding how new forms of active citizenship are conceived 
and managed in Russia and China. These practices include simultaneously extending 
participatory opportunities while restricting who can participate, and holding participatory 
events but undermining their outcomes. While the nature of state-society relations in Russia 
and China differ substantially, both governments are attempting to harness the growing desire 
of citizens to engage in local politics while ensuring that the state remains dominant. The result 
is the legislative development and discursive legitimation of a form of citizenship that requires 
engagement but compliance, responsibility but obedience, autonomy but restraint. 
 
Three conclusions about the nature of local governance in contemporary non-democratic states 
can be drawn from this discussion. First, new forms of civic participation have become 
necessary as non-democratic governments have implemented market reforms of the public 
sectors without undergoing broader processes of democratisation. The consequence of shifting 
towards regulatory statehood is that governments are no longer the primary source of 
knowledge or expertise about policy requirements, and input by non-state actors becomes 
essential for effective policy-making and delivery. The proliferation of participatory 
mechanisms therefore provide evidence that market-oriented bureaucratic transformation 
cannot occur without the provision of some avenues of political engagement for citizens. 
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Practices of participatory authoritarianism constitute governments’ attempts to manage and 
limit this political transformation.  
 
Second, the article proposed that types of active citizenship are important in non-democratic 
states like Russia and China. Indeed, Russian and Chinese leaders have embraced the notion 
of civic participation, seeking to incorporate it into broader theories and ideologies of 
governing. This demonstrates that voluntary practices of civic participation enacted by active 
and engaged citizens are considered essential for local governance in an era of late capitalism, 
as market-oriented political subjectivities are produced through interactions between the 
individual and the local state – in democratic and non-democratic regimes alike.134 At the same 
time, the way in which these practices are manifested and integrated into broader systems of 
political meanings are culturally specific and historically contingent, as demonstrated above. 
Hence, participatory authoritarianism opens the possibility of unsettling the ‘territorial trap’ 
which links types of political practices to certain geographical locales by suggesting that all 
states are constituted by practices that include both ‘democratic’ practices of openness and 
accountability and ‘authoritarian’ practices of control and arbitrariness.135 Thus, it extends 
Foucault’s analysis of liberalism in an era of late capitalism by demonstrates that both strategies 
of governing are productive of and rely upon each other in contemporary non-democracies as 
well. Works on ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ attest to the co-constitutive nature of liberalising 
and authoritarian tendencies in Western contexts; I have illustrated that similar insights can 
apply to the ‘non-West’.136 
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Finally, the article has shown how non-democratic leaders incorporate global, ostensibly 
democratic norms of governance into domestic practices of authoritarian rule. As the two states 
have engaged with international organisations promoting good governance and public sector 
reform, so their leaders have increasingly adopted analogous language and promoted greater 
roles for citizens in local policy processes. However, the way in which this discourse has been 
embodied in legislation, and the practices that are emerging as a result, demonstrate how the 
democratic potential of these global norms can be stymied by pre-existing political cultures.  It 
reveals that global democracy promotion may often consolidate domestic authoritarian 
governance. 
 
 
